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he State Bar of California was created by legislative
act in 1927 and codified in the California Constitution
at Ar icle VI, section 9. The State Bar was established
as a public corporation within the judicial branch of govern-
ment, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys prac-
ticing law in California. Over 165,000 California lawyers are
members of the State Bar.
The State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 6000 et seq., designates a Board of Governors to run the
Bar. The Board President is usually elected by the Board of
Governors at its June meeting and serves a one-year term
beginning in September. Only governors who have served on
the Board for three years are eli-
gible to run for President.
The Board of Governors Although the Bar ret
consists of 23 members: sixteen of attorney members
licensed attorneys, six non-law- mem position ar
yer public members, and the
Board President. Fifteen of the
sixteen attorney members are elected to the Board by law-
yers in nine geographic districts; the sixteenth attorney mem-
ber is a representative of the California Young Lawyers As-
sociation (CYLA), appointed by that organization's Board
of Directors each year for a one-year term. The six public
members are variously appointed by the Governor, Assem-
bly Speaker, and Senate Rules Committee. Each Board mem-
ber serves a three-year term, except for the CYLA represen-
tative (who serves for one year) and the Board President
(who serves a fourth year when elected to the presidency).
Members' terms are staggered to provide for the election of
five attorneys and the appointment of two public members
each year.
The State Bar maintains numerous standing and special
committees addressing specific issues; seventeen sections cov-
ering substantive areas of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a representative voice
to local, ethnic, and specialty bar associations statewide. Ef-
fective January 1, 2000, however, neither the sections nor the
Conference of Delegates may be financed with members'
compulsory Bar licensing fees (see MAJOR PROJECTS AND
LEGISLATION).
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of
functions which fall into six major categories: (1) testing State
Bar applicants and accrediting law schools; (2) enforcing the
State Bar Act and the Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct,
and promoting competence-based education; (3) ensuring the
delivery of and access to legal services; (4) educating the






Much of the Bar's annual bud-
get is spent on its attorney discipline
system. The system includes the nation's first full-time pro-
fessional attorney discipline court and a large staff of investi-
gators and prosecutors. The Bar recommends sanctions to the
California Supreme Court, which makes final discipline de-
cisions. However, Business and Professions Code section
6007 authorizes the Bar to place attorneys on involuntary in-
active status if they pose a substantial threat of harm to cli-
ents or to the public, among other reasons.
On August 21, the Board of Governors elected Andrew J.
Guilford as State Bar President for 1999-2000. Guilford is a
partner with Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton in Costa Mesa.
ts it  full complement Six new attorney members
ily two of its six public were recently elected to the Board
thled; o or a vis of Governors and officially joined
the four vacancies, the Bar in October. Scott H.
McNutt ran unopposed in District
1 (San Francisco and Marin counties); James Herman was
elected from District 6 (Riverside, San Bernardino, San Luis
Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties); Patrick R. Dixon
was elected from District 7 (Los Angeles); Maria Villa ran un-
opposed for the other seat in District 7; and Robert Scott Wylie
ran unopposed in District 8 (Orange County). Paul Smigliani
also assumed a one-year term on the Board as the representa-
tive from the California Young Lawyers Association.
Although the Bar retains its full complement of attorney
members, only two of its six public member positions are filled;
Governor Davis is responsible for filling the four vacancies.
On July 8, Assembly Speaker Antonio Villaraigosa appointed
Joe Hicks to a public member position on the Board of Gover-
nors. Hicks has been the Executive Director of the Los Ange-
les City Human Relations Commission since 1997; previously,
he served as Executive Director of the Southern Christian Lead-
ership Conference of Greater Los Angeles, Communications
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and Publica-
tions/Media Director of the Service Employees International
Union, Local 660. The Board's other public member is Dor-
othy Tucker; her term has expired, but she may continue to
serve until replaced by Senator John Burton. The term of pub-
lic member John Morris expired in October.
MAJOR PROJECTS
Governor Resurrects Bar
After Signing Dues Bill
Bar leaders were overjoyed when Governor Davis signed
SB 144 (Schiff and Hertzberg) (Chapter 342, Statutes of 1999)
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on September 7. At long last, SB 144 authorizes the Bar to
collect mandatory licensing fees from its members to support
most of its traditional activities. SB 144 is the Bar's first regu-
lar dues authorization since 1996; unhappy with numerous
activities of the Bar, former Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the
Bar's dues bill in 1997, causing the Bar-including its attor-
ney discipline system-to essentially shut down in June 1998.
In December 1998, the California Supreme Court issued a
special order requiring all California lawyers to pay $173 to
resurrect the discipline system, but those funds are restricted
to discipline-related activities and a special master is super-
vising their expenditure to ensure that they are spent only on
discipline (see below). [16:1 CRLR 190-94]
Although SB 144 once again authorizes the Bar to charge
its members licensing fees, it restricts licensing fees to $395
annually (as compared to $478 in 1996 and $458 in 1997) and
requires the Bar to further discount
its fees for attorneys earning less SB 144 forbids the
than $40,000 per year (see LEG- licensing fees on two
ISLATION). Further, it contains a licen fonto
number of restrictions and condi- proven controversi
tions to address past problems at associations) and its s
the Bar. First, SB 144 forbids the
Bar to use mandatory licensing
fees on two expenditures that have proven controversial-its
Conference of Delegates (which gives a voice to local bar as-
sociations) and its subject-matter "sections" (see LITIGA-
TION). The bill authorizes the Bar to collect voluntary dona-
tions for the Conference and the sections, but essentially re-
quires those two entities to become self-supporting.
SB 144 also addresses the issue of Bar lobbying on sub-
jects unrelated to its regulatory functions-a controversial is-
sue being addressed in Brosterhous v. State Bar of California
(see LITIGATION). First, the bill allows lawyers who do not
want their compulsory licensing fees to fund Bar lobbying and
other activities that are unrelated to
the "regulation of the legal profes- Critics felt the Wilso
sion or improving the quality of presented an oppor
legal services," as established in "unified" structure o
Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 unusual combination
(1992), to deduct $5 from their an- trade association wit
nual dues bill; previously, this de-
duction-as calculated by the Bar
and at issue in Brosterhous-hovered between $1-3. SB 144
also establishes a formula that restricts the amount of Keller-
violative lobbying in which the Bar may engage; the bill pre-
cludes the Bar from spending a sum on non-Keller lobbying
which exceeds the product of the number of members paying
their annual dues who did not elect the optional deduction mul-
tiplied by $5. Thus, the bill caps non-Keller lobbying expenses.
SB 144 also requires the Bar to engage in competitive
bidding before entering into any contract for goods, services,
or both in an amount greater than $50,000. This prohibition
stemmed from an especially embarrassing incident which was
a key factor leading to former Governor Wilson's 1997 veto
of the Bar's dues bill-the Bar contracted with an outside
lobbyist (who was formerly a Bar employee) at $900,000 for
two years, and included an illegal provision authorizing a
$75,000 bonus if the lobbyist was successful in securing a
two-year dues bill for the Bar. [16:1 CRLR 191]
The bill also addresses the Bar's controversial Minimum
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program. For the past
two years, the MCLE program has been paralyzed by a First
District Court of Appeal decision ruling that arbitrary excep-
tions to the MCLE requirement violate the equal protection
rights of all other lawyers required to complete MCLE; how-
ever, the program was recently reinstated by the California
Supreme Court in Warden v. State Bar of California (see LITI-
GATION). SB 144 reduces the MCLE requirement from 36
hours every three years to 25 hours every three years, makes
express legislative findings that it is in the public interest to
continue the MCLE requirement
r to use mandatory for attorneys licensed to practicependitures that have law, deletes the exception to the
-its Conference of MCLE requirement for retired
a voice to local bar judges and makes express legis-
ect-matter "sections:' lative findings underlying the re-
maining exceptions to the require-
ment, and requires the Bar to pro-
vide and encourage the development of no-cost and low-cost
programs and materials for satisfying the MCLE requirement
(with special emphasis upon the use of Internet capabilities
and computer technology in the development and provision
of these programs).
Finally, SB 144 requires the Bar to undergo external and
independent financial and performance audits. The bill re-
quires the Bar to contract with a nationally recognized inde-
pendent public accounting firm to conduct an audit of the
State Bar's financial statements for each fiscal year begin-
ning after December 31, 1998. It also requires the Bar to con-
tract with the Bureau of State
Audits (BSA) to conduct a per-
eto nditsmaftemthe formance audit of its operations
eCalitordimantle-the from July 1, 2000, through De-
reguaiforyeni Ba e cember 31, 2000, inclusive; com-
rthe same entity. mencing January 1,2002 through
December 2002, the Bar must
contract with BSA every two
years to conduct a performance audit of its operations for
that fiscal year. All of these audits must be submitted to the
Board of Governors, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and Judiciary Committees of the Senate and Assembly.
Some Bar critics were disappointed that the legislation
did not go further. Critics felt the Wilson veto and its after-
math presented an opportunity to dismantle the "unified"
structure of the California Bar-the unusual combination of
regulatory agency (with state police powers to control entry
into a profession, set standards for the practice of that profes-
sion, and enforce those standards by excising violators from
the profession through the disciplinary process-all for the












purpose of public protection) and trade association (which
functions to promote the profession rather than protect the
public) within the same entity (see LITIGATION). Others,
including former State Bar Discipline Monitor Robert C.
Fellmeth, hoped that the legislature would take the opportu-
nity to restructure the Board of Governors from an attorney-
dominated, attorney-elected body into an appointed body with
a public member majority (as many other California occupa-
tional licensing agencies are composed), and subject the Board
to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (from which the Board
is currently exempt). [16:1 CRLR 192]
With the passage of the dues bill comes the daunting job
of hiring new personnel to staff the Bar's programs funded
by the bill; the fiscal crisis presented by the 1997 Wilson veto
forced the Bar to lay off 470 of its 700 employees in June
1998. [16:1 CRLR 191] The Bar must also hire a new execu-
tive director; former Executive Director Steve Nissen left in
March 1999 after only 16 months on the job, and Acting Ex-
ecutive Director Jeffrey Gersick has repeatedly told the Bar
he is not a candidate for the position. [16:2 CRLR 168] At its
May I meeting, the Board of Governors decided to delay con-
tracting with an executive search firm to conduct a nation-
wide search until its dues bill passed; at its October 30 meet-
ing in Costa Mesa, the Board voted to allocate an amount
"not to exceed $50,000" for the retention of an executive
search firm to find a new executive director.
In a related matter, at its September meeting the Board
of Governors voted to permit attorneys who voluntarily paid
their Bar dues during 1998 and/or 1999 to apply all or part of
those fees to their 2000 membership fees or to request a re-
fund, as appropriate. Over 30,000 attorneys voluntarily paid
all or part of their dues at the request of the Bar, contributing
over $9.8 million to the Bar in its time of need.
Bar Struggling to Rebuild
Attorney Discipline System
On June 22 and September 24, Special Master Elwood
Lui filed reports documenting the progress of the State Bar in
rebuilding the attorney discipline system it was forced to dis-
mantle after former Governor Wilson's October 1997 veto of
the Bar's dues bill (see above). The effort is being funded with
a $173 special assessment ordered
by the California Supreme Court justice Lui reported t
in December 1998, and is being system faces an unprec
overseen by Special Master Lui, a 7,000 open complaini
retired court of appeal justice. In atorneys from consu
his initial February 1999 report,
Justice Lui reported that the Bar's
discipline system faces an unprecedented backlog of over 7,000
open complaints and reports against attorneys from consumers
and courts. To deal with the backlog, the Bar has instituted
new prioritization policies, default rules, and early settlement
conference policies, and has been slowly rehiring discipline
system staff-including prosecutors, investigators, and support
staff. [16:2 CRLR 168-70; 16:1 CRLR 190-94]
When the Bar's discipline system reopened in January
1999 with the help of the special assessment, Justice Lui au-
thorized the hiring of 215 employees (or 65% of the Bar's
prior discipline workforce). As the year wore on, Justice Lui
authorized more positions-up to 351 by September 13. The
Bar has filled 291 of those positions; many of the 60 vacan-
cies are in support staff positions, and the Bar is hiring tem-
porary employees to fill those positions until permanent em-
ployees can be hired.
* Office of the Chief Trial Counsel. The massive accu-
mulation of cases-which now consists not only of old com-
plaints and cases that came in and were abated during the
shutdown but also new complaints filed since January-has
been divided into (1) "inquiries"-written complaints about
the conduct of an attorney that are initially reviewed by the
intake unit of the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC),
(2) investigations-matters that have survived intake and are
currently being investigated by OCTC's investigative staff,
and (3) trial counsel matters-completed investigations that
are being reviewed or prosecuted by OCTC attorneys before
the State Bar Court. With the benefit of added staff since the
February report, OCTC has substantially reduced the num-
ber of inquiries in intake from 4,050 on March 1 to 1,697 on
September 1. The reduction in the number of investigations
and trial counsel matters has been less dramatic. Investiga-
tions decreased from 2,800 on March 1 to 2,664 on Septem-
ber 1. Trial counsel matters decreased from 1,450 on March
I to 1,142 on September 1. Overall, as of September 1, the
Bar has 1,751 cases in its "backlog" alone-the "backlog"
consists of non-complex matters pending in OCTC for more
than six months and complex matters pending in OCTC for
more than one year. However, that figure does not include
newly-arriving matters. Further, the Bar concedes that its
"backlog" figure may be artificially low because its toll-free
complaint hotline is only open half-time, and is receiving only
about one-half the number of complaints and inquiries it his-
torically received prior to the shutdown.
According to Justice Lui, matters "appear to be languish-
ing" once they reach investigations and the trial counsel unit.
To deal with this problem, the Bar's Los Angeles and San
Francisco offices are handling their caseloads in two differ-
ent ways to determine whether
either method results in more ex-dented backlog ofover pedited case processing. In San
and reports against Francisco, all open investigations
and rpourts. agai and trial counsel matters are im-
mediately assigned to an investi-
gator or prosecutor; this process
appears to ensure that egregious cases receive immediate at-
tention, but results in very high open caseloads for San Fran-
cisco investigators and attorneys. In Los Angeles, both in-
vestigators and prosecutors maintain a set caseload of cases,
and only receive new cases when they have disposed of one
of their existing cases. By September, the number of cases
handled under the different systems was too few to permit






any generalizations about the efficacy of one model vs. the
other; the only consensus reached, according to Justice Lui,
is that there are too few investigators and attorneys to handle
the overwhelming number of cases.
# State Bar Court. In his September 24 report, Justice
Lui reported that as of August 31, the State Bar Court had
filled 27 of its 37 authorized positions. The Hearing Depart-
ment still has 37 cases in abatement, while the Review De-
partment has cleared out all previously-abated cases. As of
August 31, 354 open cases remain in the Hearing Depart-
ment and 37 open cases are in the Review Department. Ac-
cording to Justice Lui, the SBC is
able to move its old cases out be- The only consensus
cause the number of new incom- justice Lui, is that th
ing cases has slowed considerably
"due to the difficulties OCTC is gators and attorne
experiencing in moving matters whelming number of
through the various stages of in-
vestigation and evaluation." However, the number of new
matters moving into the SBC is gradually increasing, with 69
new matters filed in August (up from 39 new cases filed in
June and 43 new cases filed in July).
* Other Bar Units. The discipline assessment also per-
mitted restaffing in other areas of the Bar related to disci-
pline. The Bar's Office of the General Counsel (which handles
disciplinary matters once they reach the California Supreme
Court) and Bar offices related to professional competence (in-
cluding the Bar's ethics hotline), membership records, and
fee arbitrations are gradually being restaffed.
In addition to authorizing more discipline staff positions,
Justice Lui found that "it is apparent that the State Bar is in
dire need of updated computer technology, including both hard-
ware and software," and authorized the Bar to purchase $2.4
million worth of updated computer equipment and technology,
two-thirds of which were financed
by the discipline assessment. At Even before the Cal
this writing, the Bar anticipates that resurrected the Bar's
it will complete the majority of its 5-2 decision in Warde
technology acquisition and imple- the Bar acknowled
mentation by December. widespread dissatisfa
At the end of his September
report, Justice Lui noted that he
would continue to monitor the Bar's use of the special
discipline assessment through the end of 1999, and that his
fourth report would probably be his final report. In that report,
Justice Lui will make "recommendations concerning the struc-
ture and operations of the State Bar Disciplinary System."
Bar Creates MCLE Task Force,
Reinstates Program
Even before the California Supreme Court resurrected
the Bar's MCLE program with its 5-2 decision in Warden '.
State Bar of California (see LITIGATION), the Bar acknowl-
edged its membership's widespread dissatisfaction with the





67% of California attorneys disagree that continuing educa-
tion should be mandatory; 63% believe that 36 hours of CLE
every three years is too burdensome; and well over three-
quarters of those responding disagreed with the controversial
exceptions to the requirement for retired judges, full-time law
professors, and state and federal lawyers and elected officials.
Over 60% responded that if CE were not mandatory, they
would take at least 36 hours every three years anyway.
On June 24, then-Bar President Raymond C. Marshall
created a special task force to examine the Bar's MCLE pro-
gram, hold public hearings to gather comments from its mem-
bership and the public, and make
recommendations to reform the
reahed aoo rdewings to program. The task force is chaired
e ae tfe ive by David Heilbron, a law partner
to handle the over- of Marshall's and a former State
ases. Bar president, and consists of
twelve members. Marshall
charged Heilbron's task force with reviewing the program in
its entirety and returning with a report to the Board of Gover-
nors within one year.
In August, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
exceptions to the MCLE requirement in Warden; in Septem-
ber, Governor Davis signed SB 144, which made some changes
to the controversial program. As noted (see LEGISLATION),
SB 144 decreases attorneys' MCLE burden by lowering the
required number of hours to 25 every three years, repeals an
existing requirement that lawyers take a four-hour law prac-
tice management course every three years, repeals the exemp-
tion from the requirement for retired judges, and sets forth leg-
islative findings underlying the remaining exemptions.
Following the Warden decision and the passage of SB
144, the Board of Governors at its September 16 meeting
approved a revised set of MCLE requirements and deadlines
for compliance. The new require-
rnia Supreme Court ments include at least four hours
CLE program with its of legal ethics, one hour of pre-State Bar of California, vention, detection, and treatmentditsm rhips of substance abuse and emotional
d its membership's distress, and one hour of bias
n with the program elimination in the courts and the
legal system every three years. Up
to one-half of the required hours in any three-year compli-
ance period may be satisfied by self-study.
Supreme Court Approves Regulation
to Implement SB 2086 (Keeley)
Effective July 1, the California Supreme Court has ap-
proved Rule of Court 983.4 to implement SB 2086 (Keeley),
which became effective on January 1, 1999. The legislature
enacted SB 2086 in response to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court
(ESQ Business Services Inc., Real Party in Interest), 17 Cal.
4th 119 (Jan. 5, 1998; as modified Feb. 25, 1998), in which
the court held that out-of-state attorneys not licensed to prac-







tice law in California may not enforce a fee agreement for
representing a California client in a California arbitration pro-
ceeding. Until January 1, 2001, SB 2086 amends section
1282.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure to permit out-of-state
attorneys who meet specified requirements to represent a party
in an arbitration proceeding in
California, or to render legal ser- During the summq
vices in California in connection
with an arbitration proceeding in American Bar Associ
another state. [16:1 CRLR 196- struggled with the
98] Rule 983.4, which originally could share fees ai
became effective on January 1 on couldeships a
an emergency basis, creates the partnerships with no
Bar's Out-of-State Attorney Arbi-
tration Counsel program, as required by SB 2086. The rule
incorporates by reference the requirements of section 1282.4
(which requires an out-of-state attorney seeking to represent
a client in a California arbitration proceeding to serve a cer-
tificate containing specified information on the Bar, the arbi-
trator, and all parties and counsel in the arbitration whose
addresses are known to the attorney) and imposes a $50 fil-
ing fee on out-of-state counsel. Under Rule 983.4, an attor-
ney who files a certificate containing false information is sub-
ject to discipline by the Bar.
ABA, State Bar Wrestle with
"Multidisciplinary Practice" Issue
During the summer of 1999, both the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) and the State Bar struggled with the
"multidisciplinary practice" (MDP) concept, under which law-
yers could share fees and establish business partnerships with
nonlawyers. Although the concept is popular in Europe and
has already taken hold within the "Big 5" accountancy firms
in the United States, it violates the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the State Bar's Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, and is troubling to many lawyers.
On June 8, the ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice-which has only been in existence since August
1998-released a recommendation regarding MDPs to the
ABA's House of Delegates for consideration at its August 1999
meeting. The Commission recom-
mended that the ABA amend its
model rules to "permit lawyers, "The ABA President
subject to carefully defined stan- important issue faci
dards, to deliver services to clients today. Today, lawy
through a new practice vehicle, a increasing numbers
multidisciplinary practice." The firms in the United St
Commission defined a MDP as "a they are not deliver
partnership, professional corpora- abroad such firms are
tion, or other association or entity as delivering legal sen
that includes lawyers and must address these is
nonlawyers and has as one, but not the public interest is
all, of its purposes the delivery of
legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that







lished lawyers and law school
graduates in droves; according to
has called this the most Commission Chair Sherwin P.
ng the legal profession Simmons of Florida, financial ser-
ers are practicing in vices firms-particularly the "Big
in professional services 5"-are now the largest employ-
ates, while claiming that ers of new law school graduates.
ring legal services, and The large accounting firms are
holding themselves out able to market "one-stop shop-
vices.The legal profession ping" to clients with multiple
sues now to ensure that business needs. Technically, the
served." attorney "consultants" employed
by these non-law firms are not
permitted to "practice law," but the definition of that term is
elusive in the MDP context.
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legal, services. It includes an arrangement by which a law firm
joins with one or more other professional firms to provide
services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as
part of the arrangement." Under the recommendation, lawyers
in MDPs would remain subject to all rules of professional
conduct, except that they would be
of 1999, both the permitted to form a MDP and share
on and the State Bar legal fees with a nonlawyer in a
MDP for the purposes of the de-
ultidisciplinary prac- livery of legal services. Further, the
establish business MDP would be subject to certain
esai bcertification and audit procedures
Lwyers. designed to protect the interests of
clients and the public while main-
taining the core values of the legal profession--"specificaly,
professional independence of judgment, the protection of
confidential client information, and loyalty to the client through
the avoidance of conflict of interest." The ABA Commission
stressed that its recommendation does not permit a nonlawyer
to deliver legal services.
Specifically, the Commission's recommendation contem-
plates the amendment of ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.4, which prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees
with a nonlawyer or forming a partnership with a nonlawyer
if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the prac-
tice of law. The ABA's adoption of the recommendation
(which, absent action by the State Bar to amend California's
Rules of Professional Conduct, is not binding on California)
would create an exception to Model Rule 5.4 in the case of
MDPs that conform to nine specified safeguards.
In its memorandum, the Commission noted that "the ABA
President has called this the most important issue facing the
legal profession today. Today, lawyers are practicing in in-
creasing numbers in professional services firms in the United
States, while claiming that they are not delivering legal ser-
vices, and abroad such firms are holding themselves out as
delivering legal services. The legal profession must address
these issues now to ensure that the public interest is served."
Part of the exigency perceived by the Commission is due to
the fact that the "Big 5" accounting firms are hiring estab-
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The ABA Commission issued its recommendation after
hearing 60 hours of testimony from 56 witnesses from around
the world, including U.S. and foreign lawyers, consumer ad-
vocates, representatives of four of the five largest accounting
firms in the world, law professors, chairs of ABA sections
and standing committees, officers of foreign and domestic
bar associations, ethics counsel of
foreign and domestic bar associa-
tions, small business clients, the While the MDP conc
American Corporate Counsel As- notion that the acc
sociation, and in-house counsel of intruding into the tra
international corporations. After is frustrating to many
considering this input, the Com- many lawyers are con
mission concluded that "there is on the "core values
an interest by clients in the option that the ABA Corr
to select and use lawyers who de- protect.
liver legal services as part of a
multidisciplinary practice....The Commission has concluded
that it is possible to satisfy the interests of clients and law-
yers by providing the option of a MDP without compromis-
ing the core values of the legal profession that are essential
for the protection of clients and the proper maintenance of
the client-lawyer relationship."
While the MDP concept is appealing (and the notion that
the accountancy profession is intruding into the traditional
turf of law firms is frustrating to many in the legal profes-
sion), many lawyers are concerned
about its impact on the "core val- I
ues of the legal profession" that tBis nopolc
the ABA Commission purports to ABe propos al
protect. For example, it is undis- the end o theceal
puted that lawyers are duty-bound calling and a special rc
to "keep inviolate" the confi- of justice. Perhaps thithe ABA are inevitaidences that clients share within the desirable. We have si
context of the attorney-client re-
lationship; this duty may conflict
with affirmative disclosure re-
quirements imposed on other professionals with whom a law-
yer may associate under the MDP concept, such as a mental
health worker required to disclose suspected child abuse or
an accountant performing a certified audit of a company's
financial statements for the protection of investors. The po-
tential erosion of the attorney-client privilege-which is in-
tended to encourage client honesty and forthrightness with
their legal counsel-is another area of concern. Under exist-
ing law, attorneys may not be required to testify in court
against their clients; however, accountants and other profes-
sional may be forced to disclose client information in court.
Further, the MDP setting may itself operate as a waiver of the
privilege, because the attorney will be required to share cli-
ent information with nonlawyers. For the most part, the ABA
Commission's nine safeguards attempt to preserve these "core
values" by requiring nonlawyers who affiliate with lawyers
in a MDP setting to conform their conduct to the lawyer's
professional obligations-a concept that has already been
characterized as "unworkable" by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, the nation's largest trade asso-
ciation of CPAs.
For these and other reasons, in June 1999 the State Bar's
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct
(COPRAC) recommended that the Board of Governors in-
struct its delegates to the 1999
ABA convention to suggest defer-
is appealing (and the ral of the MDP issue until the ABA
ntancy profession is further studies and solicits com-
ional turf of law firms ments from outside the ABA on
the legal profession), this important issue. After study-
rned about its impact ing the ABA Commission's rec-
the legal profession" ommendation and supporting
ission purports to documents, COPRAC stated its
belief that "the ABA is moving too
quickly on this important issue
without adequate time for vetting and comment on the ABA's
proposal. COPRAC itself does not believe it has had suffi-
cient time to absorb and comment on the myriad issues and
concerns raised by the ABA proposal.... [I]t is not hyperbolic
to wonder whether the ABA's proposal constitutes the begin-
ning of the end of the legal profession as a special calling and
a special role in the administration of justice. Perhaps the
changes envisioned by the ABA are inevitable. They might
also be desirable. We have simply not had adequate time to
form a studied opinion of the is-
wonder whether the sue." COPRAC also noted that the
utes the beginning of urgency with which the ABA is
acting appears to stem "from the
rofession as a special fact that the large accounting
in thednistaion b firms have already hired large
changes envisioned by numbers of attorneys who may be
.They might also be currently violating the ethical
pyinoth adquae strictures against fee-splitting and
opinion of the issue." forming partnerships with non-at-
torneys. We do not see that as a
good enough reason to short-circuit the nationwide delibera-
tive process that the ABA should encourage and facilitate on
this issue." At its July meeting, the Board of Governors ap-
proved COPRAC's recommendation.
At its August 10 meeting, the ABA's House of Delegates
considered the MDP Commission's recommendation, but
voted 304-98 to defer action until the issue has been further
studied by state and local bar associations and the ABA it-
self. The ABA's resolution states that "the American Bar As-
sociation makes no change, addition or amendment to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct which permits a law-
yer to offer legal services through a multidisciplinary prac-
tice unless and until additional study demonstrates that such
changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or
compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession's
tradition of loyalty to clients." Both the ABA's MDP Com-
mission and the Bar's COPRAC are expected to hold further
hearings on the MDP issue in 2000.


















SB 144 (Schiff and Hertzberg), as amended July 13, is
a Bar-sponsored bill authorizing the Bar to require members
to pay annual licensing fees during 2000 (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). In addition to its existing authority to require
members to pay $77 per year (which amount is earmarked
for specific programs), SB 144 authorizes the State Bar to
collect $3 18 as membership dues, for a total 2000 dues bill of
$395. The bill also requires the Bar to adopt a regulation pro-
viding for a 25% fee reduction if a lawyer's annual income is
less than $40,000, and a 50% offset if annual income is less
than $25,000.
SB 144 also: (1) reduces the Bar's existing MCLE require-
ment from 36 hours every 36 months to 25 hours every 36
months, and requires the Bar to develop low-cost or no-cost
options for fulfilling self-study requirements; (2) repeals the
existing exemption from the MCLE requirement for retired
judges (see LITIGATION); (3)
makes the Conference of Delegates SB 143 (Burton), as
and the State Bar sections self- controversial bill that
funding (no mandatory dues may of the State Bar Coui
be used to fund these Bar activi-
ties), but allows the Bar to collect are appointed.
voluntary fees on their behalf and
to provide administrative support services at cost; (4) allows
members to deduct $5 from their dues if they do not want their
dues used by the Bar to lobby on legislation outside the limits
of Keller v. State Bar, and limits the Bar's use of mandatory
dues on non-Keller lobbying and related activities to an amount
specified by formula; (5) requires the Bar to contract with an
independent firm to audit its financial statements for each fis-
cal year beginning after December 31, 1998; (6) requires the
Bar to contract with the Bureau of State Audits (BSA) for a
performance audit of its operations from July 1, 2000, to De-
cember 31, 2000, inclusive; every two years thereafter, the Bar
must contract with BSA to conduct a performance audit of its
operations for the respective fiscal year, commencing with Janu-
ary 1, 2002, through December 31, 2002, inclusive; and (7)
prohibits the Bar from awarding any contract for goods, ser-
vices, or both, for an aggregate amount in excess of $50,000,
unless through competitive bidding.
SB 144, which is double-joined to SB 143 (Burton) (see
below) such that both must be signed or neither will take ef-
fect, was signed by the Governor on September 7 (Chapter
342, Statutes of 1999).
SB 143 (Burton), as amended June 24, is a controver-
sial bill that changes the composition of the State Bar Court
and the way its judges are appointed. Currently, the State Bar
Court consists of a hearing panel of five judges who preside
over evidentiary hearings, and a three-judge Review Depart-
ment consisting of the Presiding Judge of the State Bar Court,
one attorney judge, and one non-attorney judge. Each of the
judges is appointed by the California Supreme Court upon
the nomination of the court's Applicant Evaluation and Nomi-
nation Committee. Effective November 1,2000, SB 143 elimi-
nates the non-lawyer judge position on the Review Depart-
ment and replaces that position with an attorney judge posi-
tion. SB 143 also permits the Supreme Court to appoint only
two of the five hearing judges, with the remaining three judges
appointed by the Governor, Senate Rules Committee, and
Assembly Speaker.
SB 143 also provides that an attorney's duty to cooper-
ate with a State Bar disciplinary investigation shall not be
construed to require an attorney to cooperate with a request
that requires the attorney to waive any constitutional or statu-
tory privilege or to comply with a request for information or
other matters within an unreasonable period of time in light
of the time constraints of the attorney's practice. Finally, SB
143 requires the Bar to compile specified disciplinary statis-
tics relating to who is prosecuted, and to issue a written re-
port on or before June 30, 2001, to the Senate and Assembly
Judiciary Committees; provides that procedures used in the
disciplinary process shall ensure
that resources of the State Bar are
amned Je 24,psao used fairly and equitably in the in-
:hanges the composition vestigation and prosecution of
t and the way its judges complaints against all attorneys;
and provides that disciplinary pro-
ceedings shall not be brought in
disproportionate numbers against attorneys practicing as solo
practitioners or in small law firms or partnerships, as com-
pared to proceedings brought against attorneys practicing in
large law firms.
According to Senator Burton, his intent in revamping the
appointing authorities of the judges on the State Bar Court is
to bring a broader diversity of opinion to the State Bar Court
and to make that court more closely resemble the structure of
the Commission on Judicial Performance, which disciplines
judges. As President pro Tern of the Senate and Chair of the
Senate Rules Committee, Senator Burton will be able to ap-
point a judge effective November 1, 2000. The Bar took no
position on SB 143 because it was double-joined to SB 144,
its dues bill. Portions of SB 143 were opposed by former State
Bar Discipline Monitor Robert C. Fellmeth, who drafted SB
1498 (Presley) (Chapter 1159, Statutes of 1988), the bill that
created the State Bar Court in its current form. [8:4 CRLR
123-24] Fellmeth objected to SB 143's provisions that re-
move the lay member from the Review Department and per-
mit State Bar Court judges to be appointed by the Governor
and legislature. Fellmeth expressed concern about the pos-
sible politicization of the State Bar Court if politicians are
permitted not only to appoint but also to reappoint its judges.
Nonetheless, Governor Davis-who is authorized to make a
major new appointment under this bill-signed SB 143 on
July 28 (Chapter 221, Statutes of 1999).
SB 72 (Murray). Rule 3-300 of the Bar's Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct prohibits an attorney from entering into a
business transaction with a client, or knowingly acquiring an
ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest
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adverse to a client, unless each of the following requirements
has been satisfied: (1) the transaction or acquisition and its
terms are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully dis-
closed in writing to the client in a manner which should rea-
sonably have been understood by the client; (2) the client is
advised in writing that the client may seek the advice of an
independent lawyer of the client's choice and is given a rea-
sonable opportunity to seek the advice; and (3) the client con-
sents in writing to the terms of the transaction.
SB 72 adds section 6175 et seq. to the Business and Pro-
fessions Code, which requires a lawyer, when acting as a fidu-
ciary, to provide detailed disclosures before the lawyer may
sell financial products to any client who is an elder or depen-
dent adult with whom the lawyer has or has had an attorney-
client relationship within the past three years. The term "finan-
cial products" is defined to include long-term care insurance,
life insurance, and annuities governed by the Insurance Code.
The lawyer must ensure that the transaction or acquisition and
its terms are fair and reasonable to the client, and must provide
the client with a disclosure that satisfies all of the following
conditions: (a) the disclosure must be in writing, clear and con-
spicuous, and on a separate document, appropriately entitled,
in 12-point print with one inch of space on all borders; (b) the
disclosure, in a manner that should be reasonably understand-
able to that client, must be signed by the client or the client's
conservator, guardian, or agent under a valid durable power of
attorney; (c) the disclosure must state that the lawyer will re-
ceive a commission and must set forth the amount of the com-
mission and the actual percentage rate of the commission, if
any (if the actual amount of the commission cannot be ascer-
tained at the outset of the transaction, the disclosure must in-
clude the actual percentage rate of the commission or the alter-
nate basis upon which the commission will be computed, in-
cluding an example of how the commission would be calcu-
lated); (d) the disclosure must identify the source of the com-
mission and the relationship between the source of the com-
mission and the person receiving the commission; (e) the dis-
closure must be presented to the client at or prior to the time
the recommendation of the financial product is made; (f) the
disclosure must advise the client that he/she may obtain inde-
pendent advice regarding the purchase of the financial prod-
uct, and the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek
that advice; (g) the disclosure must contain a statement that the
financial product may be returned to the issuing company within
30 days of receipt by the client for a refund as set forth in sec-
tion 10127.10 of the Insurance Code; and (h) the disclosure
must contain a statement that if the purchase of the financial
product is for the purposes of Medi-Cal planning, the client
has been advised of other appropriate alternatives, including
spend-down strategies, and of the possibility of obtaining a
fair hearing or obtaining a court order.
SB 72 also permits a client who has suffered damages as
a result of a violation of these disclosure requirements to bring
an action against the lawyer to recover actual and punitive
damages and injunctive relief. In addition, a client may seek
an additional award up to $10,000 where the trier of fact (1)
finds that the client has suffered substantial physical, emotional,
or economic damage resulting from the defendant's conduct;
(2) makes an affirmative finding that the lawyer knew or should
have known that his/her conduct was directed at an elder or
dependent adult; that the lawyer's conduct caused the client to
suffer substantial loss of a home, employment, or source of
income or requirement; or the client was substantially more
vulnerable than other members of the public to the lawyer's
conduct; and (3) finds that an additional award is appropriate.
Violation of the provisions in this bill by a member of the State
Bar is cause for discipline by the State Bar.
According to Senator Murray, SB 72 is designed to "pro-
tect elderly consumers from falling victim to financial scams
by providing protection and notice to a potentially vulner-
able class of clients." The author believes that seniors place
enormous trust in their attorneys and are often in crisis and
under pressure regarding financial matters; and that many
seniors are conned into purchasing financial products from
attorneys and losing their life savings. Senator Murray states
that it is imperative that the state take appropriate steps to
protect the aging population from the growing crime of fi-
nancial abuse, and that the attorney-client relationship among
lawyers and seniors must be held to the highest possible ethi-
cal standards. Governor Davis signed SB 72 on September
21 (Chapter 454, Statutes of 1999).
AB 925 (Hertzberg), as amended August 24, requires
the state Department Justice to create a statewide registry for
private conservators and guardians; all the information in the
registry would be available to courts appointing conservators
and guardians, but would otherwise remain confidential. The
bill requires all persons who wish to serve as a conservator or
guardian or who are currently serving as a conservator or
guardian to register or re-register with the statewide registry;
and also requires these conservators and guardians to file a
signed declaration containing specified information.
Under current law, private professional conservators and
guardians register with the superior court in each county, and
must annually provide specified information to the court.
According to Assemblymember Hertzberg, "a glaring flaw
in the present system is that there is no communication be-
tween counties regarding the qualifications or credibility of
those who are registered. Many conservators and guardians
are registered in more than one county. If a conservator is
registered in Los Angeles and Riverside counties and is re-
moved for cause in Los Angeles County, Riverside County
would never know. This lack of coordination prevents a court
from accessing essential information when deciding whether
to appoint a conservator or guardian. A statewide registry
would enable courts to access detailed information from
throughout the state about a conservator or guardian before
they make an appointment." Governor Davis signed AB 925
on September 16 (Chapter 409, Statutes of 1999).
AB 329 (Scott). Insurers hire attorneys to defend their
insureds, and are increasingly hiring auditing firms to review
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the bills submitted by counsel for defending their insureds, to
ensure that counsel is billing pursuant to the agreement be-
tween the insurer and counsel. As amended July 7, AB 329
adds section 11580.02 to the Insurance Code, which permits
liability insurers to review bills
submitted for the defense of its AB 1676 brings Cali
insureds, but prohibits insurers
from compensating the auditor/ nleth of 
reviewer based on any of the fol- prohibiting Californi
lowing: (a) a percentage of the from approving re
amount by which a bill is reduced judgments based on
for payment; (b) the number of he parties absent s
claims or the cost of services for thers absenrev rsal would noi
which the reviewer has denied au- interests of nonparti
thorization or payment; or (c) an
agreement that no compensation
will be due unless one or more bills are reduced for payment.
Governor Davis signed AB 329 on October 9 (Chapter 883,
Statutes of 1999).
AB 1676 (Assembly Judiciary Committee), as amended
July 14, prohibits an appellate court from reversing or vacat-
ing a duly entered judgment upon an agreement or stipula-
tion of the parties unless the court finds that there is no rea-
sonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the pub-
lic will be adversely affected by the reversal, and that the
reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the
erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification
of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated
reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.
AB 1676 brings California appellate practice in line with
that of the federal courts and the courts of almost every other
state by prohibiting California state appellate courts from ap-
proving reversals of trial court
judgments based on post-trial On August 17 in B
stipulations of the parties absent of augsor in 
specific findings that the reversal Court judge Morriso
would not adversely affect the in- Bar leaders and elat
terests of nonparties and the pub- that the Bar illegal
lic. In so doing, AB 1676 over-Un- mandatory licensi
rules Neary v. Regents of the Uni- political and ideolol
versity of California, 3 Cal. 4th decade ago.
273 (1992), a controversial Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision
that directed state appellate courts to engage in this practice
due largely to considerations of judicial efficiency. The Gov-
ernor signed AB 1676 on September 27 (Chapter 508, Stat-
utes of 1999).
AB 1042 (Cedillo). Existing law requires law students
attending unaccredited law schools pass the so-called "baby
bar" examination after the first year, and precludes them from
receiving credit for the first year or subsequent years of study
until they have passed the examination. As amended April
14, AB 1042 would repeal the "baby bar" requirement and
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AB 1452 (Alquist), as introduced in February 1999,
would require all unaccredited law schools that are subject to
the jurisdiction of the Bureau for Private Postsecondary and
Vocational Education to provide reasonable access to speci-
fied library resources, including
nia appellate practice a complete and current version of
iederal courts and the the published decisions of Cali-
other state by fornia courts (including advance
ery appellate by sheets); a digest or encyclopedia
tate appellate courts
rsals of trial court of California law; a citator forCalifornia cases and statutes; the
sial findigstats oe annotated California codes; and,
:iiidse haffect the if available, a standard text or
and the publict treatise for each course or subject
in the curriculum of the school.
"Reasonable access" to these re-
sources may be provided via online, Internet, and CD-ROM
research services. This requirement would not apply to cor-
respondence law schools. [A. Jud; A. HiEd]
LITIGATION
On August 17 in Brosterhous v. State Bar of California,
No. 95AS03901, Sacramento County Superior Court Judge
Morrison C. England Jr. stunned Bar leaders and elated Bar
critics by ruling that the Bar illegally spent its members' man-
datory licensing fees on improper political and ideological
activities almost a decade ago.
Brosterhous arose from the U.S. Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1
(1992). In Keller, the Court struck down as violative of
the first amendment the Bar's use of mandatory member-
ship fees for ideological or political purposes unrelated to
the "regulation of the legal pro-
fession or improving the qual-terhous v. State Bar ity of legal services." The Court
ito County Superior also required the Bar to adopt
. England Jr. stunned adequate procedures, such as
Bar critics by ruling those outlined in Chicago
spent its members' Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475
fees on improper U.S. 292 (1986), to protect the
Il activities almost a interests of objectors by offer-
ing them a way to "opt out" of
paying for Keller-violative ac-
tivities. In response to Keller, the Bar adopted procedures
under which it analyzes and categorizes its expenses as
"chargeable" or "nonchargeable," and offers all Bar mem-
bers an opportunity to decline to pay for the noncharge-
able portion (the so-called "Hudson deduction"). In 1992,
the Brosterhous plaintiffs challenged the Bar's 1991 cal-
culation of its chargeable vs. nonchargeable expenses dur-
ing 1989-whereas the Bar calculated its nonchargeable
expenses at $3 per lawyer, plaintiffs alleged that the Bar's
calculations failed to include numerous nonchargeable ac-
tivities and argued that their Hudson deduction for that year









Following seven years of pretrial skirmishing [16:2 CRLR
173], Judge England bifurcated the matter into two phases
(liability and damages), and issued a 41-page ruling conclud-
ing Phase 1 on August 17. In his decision, Judge England
found that the following 1989 Bar activities are not germane
to the "regulation of the legal profession" restriction estab-
lished in Keller and thus should not have been included in
the calculation of chargeable expenses: (1) the Bar's Confer-
ence of Delegates; (2) all Washington, D.C. legislative lob-
bying by the Bar's Office of Governmental Affairs, and its
legislative lobbying on many state bills in Sacramento; (3)
liaison and support services provided to local, voluntary bar
associations; (4) Volunteers in Parole, a social program that
matches attorneys as mentors to young parolees; (5) legisla-
tive lobbying on 31 out of 40 bills related to the Bar's Legal
Services Section (which promotes
the provision of legal services to
the poor); (6) several minority re- The Ninth Circuit
lations activities, including the tutionality of a "u
Ethnic Minority Relations regulatory functions
Committee's PALS mentoring non-regulatory actiN
program (devoted to mentoring plurality of the U.S.St
minority law students), the Minor- v. Donohue, and reafi
ity Attorneys Conference, and the Court in Keller.
Women in the Law Committee's
survey on gender bias; (6) Bar communications activities to
the extent they supported the above nonchargeable expenses;
and (7) general and administrative overhead expenditures to
the extent they supported the above nonchargeable expenses.
At this writing, Bar lawyers are considering a petition
for writ of mandate to the Third District Court of Appeal be-
fore Phase 2 gets under way.
On a brighter note for the Bar, on September 2 the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's dis-
missal of Morrow, et al. v. State Bar of California, 188 F3d
1174 (9th Cir. 1999), another challenge to the Bar's political
activities. Assemblymember Bill Morrow, former state Sena-
tor Barry Keene, and former San Diego City Council member
Bruce Henderson sued the Bar and its former lobbyist, Mel
Assagai, for supporting 1997 California bills that would have
raised the ceiling on pain and suffering damages in medical
malpractice cases, prohibited civil compromises in domestic
violence cases, defined a state claim for a hostile work envi-
ronment, and permitted state law claims for discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. Plaintiffs conceded these politi-
cal activities were not funded from their mandatory Bar licens-
ing fees (because they claimed their Hudson deduction), but
sought to wholly enjoin the Bar from engaging in political ac-
tivities not germane to its regulatory functions.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the constitutionality of a
"unified bar" (in which regulatory functions are commingled
with non-regulatory activities) was upheld by a plurality of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820
(1961), and reaffirmed by a unanimous Court in Keller (see
above). Because plaintiffs are not compelled to fund the Bar's
extracurricular lobbying, because plaintiffs do not contend
that mandatory bar membership restricts (directly or indi-
rectly) their ability to express their own views or to disagree
with the positions of the Bar, compels them to express any
particular ideas or make any particular utterances, or com-
pels them to associate in any way with the Bar's political
activities, and because Keller reaffirmed Lathrop on the point
that "required membership alone" does not violate a member's
constitutional rights, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the case.
On August 26 in Warden v. State Bar of California, 21
Cal. 4th 628 (1999), the California Supreme Court reversed a
1997 decision of the First District Court of Appeal and upheld
the constitutionality of the State Bar's Minimum Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) program. Created in 1989 by SB 905
(Davis) (Chapter 1425, Statutes of
consti- 1989), the MCLE program is de-
ted that the c h signed "to assure that, throughout
led bar" (in which their careers, California attorneys
res) commigld wih a remain current regarding the law,
es) was upheld by a the obligations and standards of
eme Court in Lathrou the profession, and the manage-
ment of their practices." Under
Business and Professions Code
section 6070 et seq., Bar members
must complete 36 hours of CLE during each three-year com-
pliance period, including four hours of legal ethics, four more
of either ethics or law practice management, and one hour each
in substance abuse detection and elimination of bias in the le-
gal profession. Exempt from the MCLE requirement (either as
set forth in section 6070 or in Rule 958, California Rules of
Court) are retired judges, officers and elected officials of the
State of California, full-time professors at accredited law
schools, and full-time state and federal employees acting within
the scope of their employment.
In 1993, attorney Lew Warden challenged the MCLE re-
quirement after the Bar placed him on administrative inactive
status for his refusal to comply. Warden alleged that the MCLE
program violated his right to equal protection by exempting
certain Bar members from its requirements. Although the su-
perior court granted the Bar's motion for summary judgment,
the First District reversed, finding that the statutes creating pro-
gram are unconstitutional because there is no rational relation-
ship between the goal of the legislation and the exemptions for
state officers, elected officials, retired judges, and full-time law
professors. All of these exempted members may actively rep-
resent clients, yet there is no mechanism to ensure that they are
aware of current legal developments. [16:1 CRLR 197]
After granting the Bar's petition for review, the Supreme
Court reversed on a 5-2 vote. The majority framed the issue as
follows: "[T]he constitutional question is whether an MCLE
program that generally requires attorneys licensed by the state
to complete a specified number of continuing education courses
violates the federal or state equal protection clause by exempt-
ing retired judges, state officers and elected officials, and full-








time professors at accredited law schools from the reach of the
continuing education requirement." Applying the deferential
"'rational relationship" test to rules that "have a presumption of
constitutionality," the majority concluded that the First Dis-
trict erred because "we do not believe it fairly can be said that
there is no 'reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification."'
The majority found *'at least two" plausible reasons that
rationally support each of the exemptions in question. "First,
it would not have been irrationalto conclude that the attor-
neys in each of the exempted categories, as a general matter,
are less likely than other attorneys to represent clients on a
full-time basis, thus rendering the need for a continuing edu-
cation requirement less vital, as a matter of consumer protec-
tion, for these classes than for other attorneys. Second, it would
not have been irrational to conclude that, in view of their par-
ticular professional roles and experience, the attorneys in each
of the exempt classes (again, as a general matter) are less
likely than lawyers in general to need continuing education
courses in order to be familiar with
recent legal developments or to
remain competent practitioners." justice Brown agree
The majority emphasized that it is that "the hypothetic
appropriate to evaluate the classi- art-time attorneys
fications as a whole: "Although In light of the mor
some individuals within each of consumer protecti
these classes may be as much in MCLE program: An
need of MCLE courses as other at- atn isjust d
torneys, in view of the wide berth
the state traditionally is given
when a suspect classification or fundamental right is not at
issue, the exemptions in question cannot properly be found
to be irrational or arbitrary under the traditional, deferential,
rational relationship standard."
Justices Kennard and Brown dissented in separate opin-
ions. Justice Kennard noted that the Bar's MCLE require-
ments are located in court rules, and found the majority's use
of the "inappropriately weak and deferential" rational rela-
tionship standard improper when considering a court rule as
opposed to a statute ("we owe ourselves no particular defer-
ence"). Justice Brown argued that the majority improperly
applied federal constitutional law and wholly ignored Cali-
fornia constitutional standards "as if they did not exist." She
further accused the majority of "hypothesiz[ing] the two pur-
poses that it claims justify the exemptions," and argued that
"statutory classifications [must] bear some substantial rela-
tionship to an actual, not 'constructive,' legislative purpose."
Justice Brown agreed with Justice Kennard that "the hypo-
thetical purpose of exempting part-time attorneys simply
makes no sense in light of the more general purpose of con-
sumer protection that underlies the MCLE program: An in-
competent part-time attorney is just as dangerous to the con-
sumer as an incompetent full-time attorney."
The Supreme Court denied Warden's petition for rehear-
ing on October 20; Warden intends to file a petition for cer-
tiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. As noted above, SB 144
has decreased California lawyers' MCLE obligation to 25
hours every three years, repealed the exemption for retired
judges, and eliminated the four-hour law practice manage-
ment course requirement (see LEGISLATION).
Pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Cali-
fornia, Mueller, et al. v. Committee of Bar Examiners of the
State Bar of California, No. C-97-03309, challenges the poli-
cies and procedures used by the Committee of Bar Examiners
(CBE) to review requests by people with learning disabilities
for reasonable accommodations on the Bar examination and
the first-year students' examination ("baby bar").
The case was filed by Oakland-based Disability Rights
Advocates on behalf of individual plaintiff Robert Mueller in
September 1997; later that month, the complaint was amended
to include class action allegations. By 1998, plaintiffs' sec-
ond amended complaint had added several other individual
plaintiffs, an organizational plaintiff (the International Dys-
lexia Association), and several new causes of action. Plain-
tiffs are individuals with learning
with justice Kennard disabilities who alleged they were
with u ste ofKexempnd denied reasonable accommoda-
purpose of exempting tions on examinations adminis-
imply makes no sense tered by defendant CBE. The sec-
n that underlies the o nd amended complaint alleged
that defendants discriminate
ncompetent part-time against law school graduates with
,erous to the consumer disabilities in violation of the
-time attorney." Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), the California Unruh
Civil Rights Act, the California Disabled Persons Act, and
the California Unfair Business Practices Act. In addition,
plaintiffs alleged violations of the due process and equal pro-
cess clauses of the fourteenth amendment and seek relief pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Essentially, plaintiffs alleged that (1) the CBE's written
forms and guidelines required applicants to undergo expen-
sive, invasive, burdensome, and unnecessary diagnostic test-
ing, much of which was geared toward the evaluation of psy-
chiatric problems rather than learning disabilities; (2) the CBE
relied on a single consultant to develop policy and make de-
terminations on individual petitions for accommodations, even
though that consultant had "virtually no relevant experience
in the field of learning disability and had publicly expressed
bias against law graduates and law students with learning dis-
abilities"; (3) the CBE routinely rejected the clinical judg-
ments of the applicants' treating clinicians when ruling on
individual accommodations requests; and (4) the CBE failed
to develop a neutral and informed appellate process to re-
view the determinations made by its consultant.
In defense, the Bar stated that it has "at all times used
and applied procedures for the reasonable accommodation of
learning disabilities on the Bar Exam....The Committee com-
plied with its legal duty to provide reasonable accommoda-
tions to those named plaintiffs (and members of the putative









class) who presented documentation supporting a claimed
disability within the meaning of the ADA. The Committee
has provided significant reasonable testing accommodations,
including substantial extra time, for many of the named plain-
tiffs in this case." The Bar also argues that a class action for-
mat is inappropriate, because plaintiffs' disability discrimi-
nation claims involve "numerous individualized determina-
tions of law and fact."
During the pendency of the lawsuit, the Bar has insti-
tuted a number of significant changes in the way it handles
requests for accommodation. During 1998, the CBE convened
a "blue-ribbon panel of experts" to review its disability docu-
mentation guidelines and other policies and procedures re-
lated to processing requests for accommodations. The panel
consists of five national experts in the field of learning dis-
ability. According to plaintiffs, the panel has "presented a
completely revised set of written guidelines and application
forms for the diagnostic testing and other criteria necessary
to document a learning disability and need for accommoda-
tions. The panel also recommended standards for the mini-
mum qualifications of the consultants which the Bar uses to
review the merits of requests for accommodations based on
learning disabilities."
In addition, at approximately the same time as the Mueller
action was filed, the Bar circulated for comment new Rule
XVII of its Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in
California, entitled "Testing Accommodations to Take the
First-Year Law Students' Examination and California Bar
Examination." According to the Bar, new Rule XVII would
"formalize and update [CBE's] policies and develop new ones
to ensure that the process is clearly defined, expeditious, and
fair." Under Rule XVII, an applicant seeking testing accom-
modations for a disability must file with the Bar a petition
plus seven attached forms which include information regard-
ing the disability and the requested accommodation(s) from
the petitioner, the petitioner's treating health care
professional(s), and the petitioner's law school regarding ac-
commodations granted for taking examinations. The rule also
specifies the Bar's process for reviewing the petition and
notifying the petitioner of its status, and provides for appeal
of an adverse determination and emergency petitions under
certain circumstances. Finally, the rule notifies applicants that
they must re-petition for accommodations on a subsequent
exam if they do not pass the first exam. During a public com-
ment period that ended on January 20, 1998, the Bar received
no comments on its proposed rule. At this writing, the Board
of Governors has not yet approved proposed Rule XVII.
While plaintiffs are apparently satisfied with these
changes and claim that they were instituted by the Bar in di-
rect response to their lawsuit, the Bar states that it "has sub-
mitted its policies and procedures regarding petitions for the
accommodation of learning disabilities on the Bar Exam for
review and comment by third party consultants and the pub-
lic at large on numerous occasions well before the filing of
this case." The Bar also contends that plaintiffs' claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief are moot due to its institu-
tion of these changes. However, the Bar's motion for partial
summary judgment on that issue was largely denied in June.
At this writing, the case is still pending. An October 14 hear-
ing on plaintiffs' motion for class certification was taken off
calendar, and the parties are reportedly in settlement negotia-
tions focusing largely on the issue of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
Pending before the California Supreme Court are two
Review Department decisions challenging summary disbar-
ments under Business and Professions Code section 6102(c).
That statute requires the summary disbarment of an attorney
convicted of a felony that involves moral turpitude or where
an element of the offense is the specific intent to deceive,
defraud, steal, or make or suborn a false statement. In June,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear In The Matter of
Paguirigan, No. S076968, concerning the summary disbar-
ment of Cristeta A. Paguirigan after her conviction for forg-
ing two declarations in a civil matter, a crime of moral turpi-
tude. On September 15, the court agreed to hear In The Mat-
ter of Lesansky, No. S079499, a Review Department deci-
sion summarily disbarring Pasadena attorney Stuart K.
Lesansky following his no contest plea and conviction of an
attempted lewd act upon a minor. Sexual crimes involving
children constitute moral turpitude per se. The respondents'
petitions for review argue that, as interpreted by the Bar in
this case, section 6102(c) usurps the plenary authority of the
California Supreme Court over attorney discipline because it
does not permit a respondent to present or the court to con-
sider evidence of mitigating factors. In the Lesansky case,
attorney Lesansky met Jennifer Hersey over the Internet;
Hersey stated she was 14 but looked 17. After several online
chats of a sexual nature, Lesansky arranged to meet Hersey.
They met in San Diego and again in Los Angeles. According
to Lesansky, there was no physical or sexual contact at either
meeting. However, Hersey was in reality a 20-year-old re-
porter working with Fox News on a story about sex on the
Internet. Lesansky was arrested after the Los Angeles meet-
ing, and pleaded no contest to one count of an attempted lewd
act upon a child. He was sentenced to one year of probation
and ordered to pay $200 to a restitution fund and seek psy-
chiatric counseling. Lesansky seeks to present evidence of
the circumstances of his conviction and numerous character
witnesses. At this writing, the court has yet to hear oral argu-
ment in either matter.
FUTURE MEETINGS
" December 3-4, 1999 in Los Angeles.
" February 4-5, 2000 in Los Angeles.
" March 3 I-April 2, 2000 in San Francisco.
" May 19-20, 2000 in Los Angeles.
" June 9-10, 2000 in San Francisco.
" August 25-26, 2000 in San Francisco.
" September 14-17, 2000 in San Diego (annual meeting).
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